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Abstract
We propose a method to analyze secure information ﬂow in stack-based assembly languages, communicating with the
external environment by means of input and output channels. The method computes for each instruction a security level
for each memory variable and stack element. Instruction-level security analysis is ﬂow-sensitive and hence is more precise
than other analyses, such as standard security typing. Instruction-level security analysis is speciﬁed in the framework of
abstract interpretation. We deﬁne concrete operational semantics which handles, in addition to execution aspects, the ﬂow
of information of the program. The basis of the approach is that each value is annotated by a security level and that
the abstract domain is obtained from the concrete one by keeping the security levels and forgetting the actual values.
Operand stack are abstracted as ﬁxed-length stacks of security levels. An abstract state is a map from instructions to abstract
machine conﬁgurations, where values are substituted by security levels. The abstract semantics consists of a set of abstract
rules manipulating abstract states. The instruction-level security typing can be performed by an efﬁcient ﬁxpoint iteration
algorithm, similar to that used by bytecode veriﬁcation.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The secure information ﬂow property within programs in multilevel secure systems requires that information
at a given security level does not ﬂow to lower levels [42]. The goal is to guarantee conﬁdentiality: an observer
that has access to information with a given secrecy level must be prevented from ﬁnding out anything about
more secret information.
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Fig. 1. A Java Card that hosts three applets. Applet B can disclose some A’s data to applet B, without violating the ﬁrewall policy.
A common way to ensure conﬁdentiality is based on access control mechanisms [12]: each user is given read
and/or write right on a set of objects. However, access control mechanisms only control the release of infor-
mation, they do not check the propagation of the information within the accessed entity. On the other hand,
once a user has been given an access right to some data, by analyzing the information ﬂow within programs it is
possible to check whether the accessed information is being used properly, i.e. that it is not propagated to other
entities who are not allowed to know that particular data. Let’s look at the following example in the context of
Java Card.1
Example. A Java Card [18] is a smart card running a Java Virtual Machine (the Java Card Virtual Machine—
JCVM), and is becoming a secure token in various ﬁelds, such as banking and public administration. The Java
Card systemwas designed to speed up the development of applications (applets) and to increase portability. The
JCVM is single-threaded, but more than one applet can coexist on the same card. Applets are normally isolated
by means of the Java Card Firewall mechanism. This ﬁrewall allows an applet to access external objects only
through an object sharing mechanism, called a shareable interface. The ﬁrewall is based on an access control
policy and therefore does not control information propagation.
Now let’s look at a card that hosts three applets, say A, B, and C, each issued by a different commercial entity
(see Fig. 1). Suppose that some partnership exists such that A must share some data with B to cooperate and
likewise B with C in order to be able to cooperate, whereas A and C must not share information. Therefore the
applets must be programmed to inform the ﬁrewall of this cooperation. Thus the ﬁrewall allows communication
between A and B and communication between B and C, but prevents communication between A and C. Never-
theless, it is not able to check whether A’s conﬁdential data is not being propagated to C through B. This can be
checked by analyzing the information ﬂow in B’s code.
This work deals with a static analysis of programs to check information ﬂow. We consider stack-based
assembly language programs communicating with the external environment by means of input and output
channels, used during the execution to receive and to send data, respectively. Channels are the only way in which
the program communicates with the external environment, while the internal behavior of the machine executing
the program is not observable. A security policy associates each channel with a security (secrecy) level: a channel
with a given secrecy level is allowed to contain only data with that level or a lower one. Security levels form a
lattice. The program can be used by a set of users who are each given a ﬁxed security level. A user is allowed to
send/receive data to/from the program by using only channels with a security level less than or equal to the user
level. A program satisﬁes the secure information ﬂow property under a given security policy P if the observation
of the values sent to (received from) the channels having a given security level does not reveal any information
about the values sent to (received from) the channels with higher (more secret) security levels. In other words,
for each security level , it must be the case that two executions of the program, receiving the same sequence
of elements from the channels associated with  or with a level lower than , perform the same sequence of
insertions and extractions to/from the channels associated with  or with a level lower than .
1 This example is inspired by the PACAP case study [17].
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Wepresent a static analysis to analyze information ﬂow in a speciﬁc language.We call this analysis instruction-
level security analysis. It is based on an abstract interpretation approach [20–22]. The program is abstractly
executed on a domain of security levels instead of normal data. The abstract semantics is obtained as an
abstraction of a concrete one. We deﬁne an instrumentation of the standard dynamic semantics of the language
to take into account the security level of the data. The instrumented concrete operational semantics handles,
in addition to execution aspects, the level of the ﬂow of information of the program. Each value is annotated
by a security level and the level of data ﬂowing through the variables and the stack is calculated dynamically.
We then deﬁne a collecting semantics [33] associating to each program point (instruction) the set of concrete
states in which the machine can be when the point is reached. We prove that the collecting semantics correctly
annotates data with the security level on which they depend.
We then deﬁne the abstract semantics and prove that it is a correct abstraction of the collecting semantics. The
abstract execution always terminates and the output of the analysis is a mapping from instructions to abstract
machine conﬁgurations. Each conﬁguration speciﬁes a security level for eachmemory location, stack element and
channel. This level is the maximum security level of the information that can be present in the memory locations,
stack and channel during any execution of the program when the corresponding instruction is executed. The
program has secure information ﬂow if the level computed by the analysis for each channel in each conﬁguration
is less than or equal to the level assigned to the channel by the security policy. The abstract execution of the
program can be performed by means of an efﬁcient ﬁxpoint iteration algorithm, which was inspired by the Java
Bytecode Veriﬁcation [39]. Java Bytecode is the intermediate code produced by Java compilers. The Bytecode
Veriﬁer performs safety checks on the code by using an instruction-level typing algorithm. For each instruction
it infers a type for every variable and stack element (assuming that the stack height is ﬁxed for each instruction).
JavaBytecodeVeriﬁcation is performedduring the execution of a Java programwhenever a Java class is required
for execution. It must thus be efﬁcient in order to not slow down the execution. Our analysis is similar to Java
Bytecode Veriﬁcation but it operates on security levels instead of types.
Let us summarize the main characteristics and contributions of the paper.
• We present an approach to check the secure information ﬂow property, which is based on abstract inter-
pretation. The abstract interpretation framework allows a standard formal proof of the correctness of the
analysis. Moreover, since the program is executed, even though abstractly, it is generally possible to obtain a
greater accuracy than with other static methods. The abstract interpretation which underlies our method is
able to infer for each instruction the maximum security level of the data that can pass through the channels
during any execution of the program. We obtain a greater precision than other methods that check secure
information ﬂow, for example those based on security typing.
• The method is a good compromise between expressive power and efﬁciency. It can be implemented by an
algorithm similar to the well known very efﬁcient one executed by the Java Bytecode Veriﬁer.
• The secure information ﬂow property that we deﬁne concerns the sequence of manipulations of the input
and output channels during the execution. A program can also be seen as a process, possibly looping forever,
which executes in parallel with other processes and communicates with them by means of the input and
output channels. Hence, the method can be easily extended to concurrent languages.
• The language we consider is an assembly language. Additional problems with respect to high-level languages
are required when checking assembly languages, above all with regard to stacks. We introduce a parametric
notion of stack abstractionwhich can be used for assembly languages and allowsmore ﬂexibility than existing
ones.
We applied the method described in the paper to a high-level language with dynamic structures [23]. The
initial idea was originally conceived by Avvenuti et al. [5].
The language and the security model are presented in Section 2, while Section 3 gives an overview of the
method. Section 4 describes the concrete semantics and proves that is suitable for describing information ﬂows.
Section5 introduces the abstract domains and their relationwith the concrete ones. Section6presents the abstract
semantics, that is the instruction-level security analysis, proves its correctness and discusses its complexity. An
application of the method to a non-trivial example is presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 discusses related
work and concludes.
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2. The Model
We consider a representative subset of instructions of a conventional stack-based assembly language that
manipulates integers. Our language has an operand stack, a memory containing the local variables, simple
arithmetic instructions, conditional and unconditional jumps and primitives for input/output in a message
passing style. The instructions are reported in Fig. 2, where x ranges over a set Var of local variables, op over a
set of binary arithmetic and logic operations (add, sub, eq. . .) and a over a set of I/O channels.
Each instruction is labeled by a label t ∈ B = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∪ {end}. The fake instruction end represents the
termination of the program. Hereafter, NamesI (NamesO) denotes the input (output) channel names occurring
in P . We suppose NamesI ∩ NamesO = ∅. The set Names = NamesI ∪ NamesO denotes the set of all channels.
We assume that programs respect the following constraints:
(1) executions do not jump to undeﬁned addresses;
(2) no stack overﬂow and underﬂow occurs;
(3) for each instruction, the height of the stack when the instruction is executed is always the same in all
executions.
The ﬁrst and second assumptions are made only for simplicity of presentation, in order to avoid performing
the corresponding checkswhendeﬁning the semantics of the language. The third one is not too restrictive: it is, for
example, checked by the Bytecode Veriﬁer [39, Section 4.9.2] for compiled Java programs. The ﬁrst assumption
can be statically veriﬁed by checking all the labels of if and goto instructions. A simple abstract interpretation
based analysis can be used to statically check the second and the third assumptions: each instruction is abstracted
as its effect on the stack height, and the analysis can calculate the stack height at each program point.
The run-time behavior, described informally in Fig. 2, is illustrated in Fig. 3 by means of a small-step opera-
tional semantics. A state 〈t,e, se, ce〉 of the computation is composed of:
• the label t of the instruction being executed;
• the memory e that maps variables names to integer values;
• the operand stack se which is a sequence of integer values;
• the channels status ce that maps channel names to their contents.
Each channel is modeled as a sequence of integers. We use the · operator to denote concatenation,  for the
empty sequence, and s for the length of the sequence (stack) s. If the stack is se = [k1 · k2 · . . . · kn], then k1 is
Fig. 2. Instruction set.
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Fig. 3. Dynamic semantics for the instruction set in Fig. 2.
the top element. The notation f [y ← v] stands for the function f ′ such that f ′(x) = f(x) if x /= y , f ′(y) = v
otherwise. The domains of the dynamic semantics are reported in Fig. 4.
The transitions deﬁned by the rules are labeled with actions that can be of three types:
• input actions: a  k with a ∈ NamesI and k ∈ , meaning that the value k has been received from input
channel a;
• output actions: a  k , with a ∈ NamesO and k ∈ , meaning that the value k has been sent to output channel
a;
• unobservable action: , meaning that the channels are left unchanged.
The transitions have been labeled to emphasize that it is not possible from the outside to inspect the complete
state of the computation, but only the observable actions, i.e. operations performed on the channels. An initial
state of the program is given by means of the initial contents of the input channels. Given a conﬁguration
of input channels ceI : NamesI → , the initial state corresponding to ceI is deﬁned as
〈
1,e0, , c
e
0
〉
, where e0
associates the value 0 with every variable, the stack is empty, for every channel a ∈ NamesI : ce0(a) = ceI (a) and∀b ∈ NamesO , ce0(b) = , i.e. the initial state of the output channels is empty. Finally, we denote by (ceI ) the
(ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence of actions that label the transitions of the computation starting from the initial state
corresponding to ceI .
The security model is based on a set of security (secrecy) levels. Security levels are deﬁned as a ﬁnite lattice
(L,L), partially ordered by L. The levels are ordered in increasing secrecy: higher levels represent more
secret information. We assume that L contains a minimum element minL. Least upper bound operation (lub) is
denoted by unionsqL.
Given a program P , we denote a security policy by P : Names → L; a security policy is an assignment of
security levels to the channels used in P . We assume that each external observer with a conﬁdentiality level  ∈ L
can only inspect the channels with a secrecy level less than or equal to . The secure information ﬂow property
that we want to ensure is that the information belonging to a security level is not affected by the information
belonging to higher security levels. More precisely, for any channel a, the contents of a in any computation
Fig. 4. Domains of the dynamic semantics.
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must not be affected by data from channels with a security level higher than P(a). Thus external observers with
secrecy level P(a) cannot know the more secret information, because they can only inspect the channels with
levels that are lower than or equal to P(a). The property is formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (secure information ﬂow). Let P be a program and P a security policy for P .
Given  ∈ L, let us denote by NamesI = {a | a ∈ NamesI ,P(a)  } and NamesO = {a | a ∈ NamesO ,
P(a)  } the set of input, respectively, output channels associated by P to a security level less than or equal
to .
Let ceI ,1, c
e
I ,2 : NamesI →  be any two initial states of the input channels that agree on channelswith security
level less than or equal to , i.e. ∀a ∈ NamesI : ceI ,1(a) = ceI ,2(a).
Let the sequences 1 and 
2
 be the projections of (c
e
I ,1) and (c
e
I ,2), respectively, on the actions in Names

I ∪
NamesO , that is the actions concerning only the input and output channels with a security level lower than or
equal to .
P has -secure information ﬂow (is -secure) under P if 1 = 2 .
P has secure information ﬂow (is secure) if it is -secure for each  ∈ L.
For each security level , -security assures that, for any two computations that agree on the initial contents
of the input channels with security level less than or equal to , the sequence of data sent to/received from the
input/output channels with security level less than or equal to  is the same. General security means -security
for every .
3. Overview of the method
Instruction level security analysis is based on abstract interpretation [20–22]. Abstract interpretation is a
method for analyzing programs in order to collect approximated information about their run-time behavior.
It is based on a non-standard abstract semantics, which is a semantic deﬁnition in which a simpler (abstract)
domain replaces the standard (concrete) one, and the operations are interpreted on the new domain. The static
analysis is the abstract semantics.
The abstract semantics operates on security levels instead of actual values: each value is abstracted as a
security level. The security level of a value is the lub of the security levels of all information ﬂows on which
the value depends. The contents of each channel is abstracted as a security level, initially the level associated
with the channel by the security policy. The levels ﬂowing through the variables, the stack, and the channels
are calculated dynamically, taking into account both the explicit and the implicit information ﬂows. An explicit
ﬂow occurs when a memory location is assigned a value or when a value is taken from (inserted onto) a channel
or when a value is pushed onto the stack. An implicit ﬂow occurs when an instruction may or may not be
executed depending on some condition. Implicit ﬂows are introduced by conditional commands. For example,
the high-level language command if (y=0) then x:=0; else skip; introduces an implicit ﬂow
from y to x. In fact, checking the ﬁnal value of x reveals information on the value of y. Hence, the level of x after
the execution of the command must take into account the level of y. To manage implicit ﬂows, we use a security
environment, which associates a security level with each instruction. Whenever a conditional jump instruction t
is executed, the level of the condition (top of the stack) is used to upgrade the environment of all instructions
belonging to the scope of t. When an instruction is executed, the levels manipulated by that instruction are
upgraded, when necessary, to the level of the environment.
In the abstract semantics, security levels are manipulated instead of values, according to the semantics of the
instructions and to the environment. For example, a recv a instruction at address t pushes onto the stack the
lub of the level contained in a and the level of the environment of t. Also the contents of a can be upgraded
according to the level of the environment of t. A send a instruction (possibly) upgrades the contents of a
taking into account both the level which is the top of the stack and the level of the environment. We use abstract
stacks of parametric length. If n is the maximum length of abstract stacks, a concrete stack of length m  n is
approximated by an abstract stack in this way: its ﬁrst n− 1 elements model the ﬁrst n− 1 items of the concrete
stack and the last one approximates all the remaining m− n+ 1 concrete items.
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An abstract state is a mapping q, associating to each instruction t an abstract machine conﬁguration q(t)
that contains security levels instead of actual values. The conﬁguration q(t) represents the abstract machine
state before the execution of t. Each conﬁguration describes also the environment level of the corresponding
instruction. Instruction t is executed in state q(t) and the produced state is merged (by means of a lub operation)
with the state q(t′) of each successor instruction t′, producing a new state for q(t′). Merging is necessary since,
due to the conditional and unconditional jumps, there are instructions corresponding to a join of different paths
of the control ﬂow graph. Merging two states consists in merging the level of each variable, stack element and
channel. The analysis iterates the execution of the program instructions until a ﬁxpoint is reached, that is q is
no longer modiﬁed. The ﬁnal state obtained is the output of the analysis. The secure information ﬂow property
is satisﬁed if the contents of each channel in each row are less than or equal to the level assigned to the channel
by the security policy.
In order to apply the abstract interpretation approach, we need a concrete semantics to be abstracted onto
the abstract one. The concrete semantics is obtained by instrumenting the standard dynamic semantics to take
into account the security level of the data. The instrumented concrete operational semantics handles, in addition
to execution aspects, the level of the ﬂow of information of the program. In fact it operates on values annotated
with security levels. We then deﬁne a collecting semantics [33] associating to each program point (instruction)
the set of concrete states in which the machine can be when that point is reached. We prove that the collecting
semantics correctly annotates data and thus is able to dynamically reveal violations of secure information ﬂow.
The concrete semantics is used only for proving the correctness of the analysis. If we do not consider security
annotation, this semantics reduces to the standard dynamic semantics deﬁned in the previous section. We show
that the abstract semantics is an abstraction of the collecting semantics, where the abstract domains are obtained
from the concrete ones by keeping the security annotations and forgetting the actual values. The correctness of
the method is then proved in the standard way for abstract interpretation.
3.1. An example
Let us now give an example of application of the analysis. Suppose that the latticeL only consists of two levels
L and H , with LLH , and the program manipulates two input channels pubI and privI, public and private,
respectively, that is P(pubI) = L, P(privI) = H , and a public output channel pubO, such that P(pubO) = L.
Consider the code in Fig. 5 which shows a non-secure implicit ﬂow. The value taken initially from the private
channel privI affects the public channels pubI and pubO. If it is different from 0, a value is taken from pubI
and sent onto pubO. If it is equal to 0, the channel pubI is not used and 0 is put onto pubO. A user with level L,
who is only allowed to observe the low channels, can then derive information on the value taken from privI
Fig. 5. A simple example. The source code on the right (b) can be compiled in the assembly code on the left (a) by allocating the variable
x on the stack.
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(zero or non-zero) by observing if a value has been taken or not from pubI or by observing the value inserted
into pubO.
The initial state of the analysis is shown in Fig. 6(a). It is a table q with 10 rows, each one corresponding
to an instruction. In the ﬁrst row the contents of the channels is that deﬁned by the policy for input channels
(H for privI, L for pubI) and the minimum level L for the output channel pubO and for variable y. If we
consider abstract stacks with maximum length 2, the initial stack, which is empty, is represented by [⊥V · ⊥V ],
where ⊥V is the bottom abstract value. In the other rows of the table, y and the stack hold undeﬁned values
(respectively, ⊥V and ⊥S ) and all the channels are set to the minimum level L. In each row the environment is set
to the minimum level L. Fig. 6(b) shows the state after instruction 1 has been abstractly executed. The machine
state produced by the execution of instruction 1 (an item taken from channel privI has been pushed onto the
stack) is merged with q(2) (the old machine state corresponding to instruction 2). Note that the stack contains
H , since the datum taken from a channel coincides with the level of the channel. When instruction 2 is executed,
since the top of the stack is H , the environment of all instruction in the scope of 2 (i.e. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) is upgraded
to H , to indicate the implicit ﬂow generated by instruction 2. The machine conﬁguration after the execution of
instruction 2 is merged with rows 3 and 8, corresponding to the instructions which are immediate successors of
2; the resulting table is shown in Fig. 6(c). When instruction 3 is executed, channel pubI contains L but, since
instruction 3 has a high environment, the level put onto the stack isH and the level of channel pubI is upgraded
to H , see Fig. 6(d). After executing the subsequent instructions, the level of y becomes H and in the ﬁnal state
(the ﬁxpoint, see Fig. 6(e)) the level of pubO is H too. Here, the level computed for channels pubI and pubO is
higher than that assigned to them by the security policy, and so the program is not certiﬁed by the analysis.
The analysis reveals what channels may contain information that is not allowed to ﬂow through them. Hence
we are able to identify the insecure points of the program and in particular the insecure channels. In fact we
compute themaximum security level of the data taken from/sent to each channel, starting from the level assigned
to input channels by the security policy.
4. Concrete semantics
In this section, we deﬁne the concrete semantics of the language. To take into account the security level of
data, we annotate each value k ∈  with a security level, representing the lub of the security levels of the explicit
and implicit information ﬂows on which k depends. Hence a concrete value is a pair (k , ), where k is an integer
and  a security level. A memory is a map from variable names to concrete values. A stack is a sequence of
concrete values. Each channel is represented by a pair whose ﬁrst element is a sequence of integer values (i.e. the
sequence of values present on the channel), and the second is a security level that represents the current security
level of the channel. This level, initialized by the policy, can be upgraded during the execution depending on the
operations issued on the channel. The concrete domains are deﬁned in Fig. 7.
The semantics is deﬁned by means of the set of rules in Fig. 8, deﬁning a labeled relation
l−→ : Q → Q
between the states of the computation. If security annotations are ignored the rules are the same as those of
the standard dynamic semantics presented in Section 2. Moreover, a state is still composed by a memory, a
stack, and channels, (that now manipulate concrete values) plus a security environment . The set of states is
then Q = B × Env×M× S × C. Each state q ∈ Q is a tuple 〈t, ,, s, c〉 that describes the conﬁguration of the
machine when executing the instruction t:  deﬁnes the values of variables, s represents the status of the stack,
while c describes the channels status. The security environment  ∈ Env in each state associates a security level
with every instruction. This security level represents the level of the implicit ﬂow under which the instruction is
executed. The environment is initially set to minL for all instructions and can be upgraded by the conditional
jump instructions.
Values manipulated under a security environment are upgraded when necessary, as follows. Each value (k , 	)
that has been evaluated, tested, pushed onto the stack, stored in a variable, sent or received during the execution
of instruction t, changes its security level into (t) unionsqL 	. In rule op the level of the value pushed onto the stack
is the lub of the levels of the used values and of the environment. In rule push the level of the constant value
pushed onto the stack is the level of the environment, since the initial level of a constant is assumed to be the
minimum secrecy level. Rule load and store are similarly deﬁned.
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c d
e
Fig. 6. The computations of the abstract semantics for the example in Fig. 5: the initial state (a), the states after the abstract executions of
instruction 1 (b), 2 (c), 3 (d) and the ﬁxpoint (e).
Rule receive takes a value from the speciﬁed input channel and pushes it onto the stack, annotated with the
lub of the level of the channel and the environment of t. The secrecy annotation of the channel is updated in the
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E
Fig. 7. Domains of the concrete semantics.
same way. As a consequence, if (t) is higher than the previous annotation of the channel, then the annotation of
the channel is upgraded, to indicate the fact that themanipulation of the channel depends on an information ﬂow
with level higher than the previous annotation. Likewise, in rule send , the level of the speciﬁed output channel
can be upgraded taking into account the level of the value and that of the environment of the instruction.
Whatever branch is chosen, rules if upgrade the environment of all the instructions belonging to the scope of
the conditional jump instruction, in order to take into account the level of the condition. Given a conditional
instruction t, the set scope(t) contains all the instructions that may or may not be executed depending on the
value tested by t. The deﬁnition of scope is given in the following subsection.
4.1. Deﬁnition of scope
We denote by ⊆ B × B the relation where t  t′ says that instruction t′ can be executed immediately after
instruction t, that is
t  j if t: goto j
t  j, t  t + 1 if t: if j
t  end if t: halt
t  t + 1 otherwise
Moreover, we deﬁne  as the transitive closure of . We also need a function ipd:B → B that calculates
the immediate postdominator of an instruction. The immediate postdominator of t represents the ﬁrst common
instruction in all the possible execution paths that start from t and reach the ﬁnal node [16].
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Postdomination, immediate postdomination). Let t1, t2 be instructions in B: t2 postdominates t1,
denoted by t2 pd t1, if t2 is on every possible execution path from t1 to end. We use t2 pd+ t1 iff t1 pd t2 and
t1 = t2. Moreover t2 immediately postdominates t1, denoted by t2 = ipd(t1), if t2 pd+ t1 and there is no instruction
t3 such that t2 pd+ t3 pd+ t1.
For each conditional jump instruction t, the set deps(t) contains all the instructions of the control ﬂow graph
between t and ipd(t):
deps(t) = {t′ | ∃ a path from t to t′ that does not contain ipd(t)}
Since we analyze non-terminating programs as well as terminating ones, we must take into account that, if a
loop exists in deps(t), then it is possible that the instructions following ipd(t) are not executed if the program
loops inﬁnitely. Hence also these instructions are affected by the implicit ﬂow generated by t. Moreover, it is
also possible that the paths starting from t never join, since each branch is a loop and ipd(t) does not exists. Also
in this case, all the instructions that are reachable from t must be considered in the scope of t. The scope of the
implicit ﬂow generated by t is deﬁned by the function scope:B → ℘(B).
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Scope).
scope(t) =
{ {t′ | t  t′} if t  end ∨ ∃ path  : t · · · t′ · · · t′ s.t.ipd(t) ∈ 
deps(t) otherwise
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Fig. 8. Concrete semantics for the instruction set in Fig. 2.
If either t does not reach end or deps(t) contains a loop, then scope(t) contains all the instructions reachable
from t. On the other hand, if deps(t) does not contain a loop, then scope(t) is equal to deps(t). The functions
ipd, deps, and scope can be statically computed using the control ﬂow graph of the program [2].
4.2. Collecting semantics
We now deﬁne a collecting semantics [33], whereby each instruction is associated with the set of states in
which the instruction can be executed in any computation. As a consequence, a concrete state is a collection of
execution states. The concrete state domain is deﬁned as follows. First, we formally deﬁne the initial state of a
computation.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (initial state). Let P be a program and P a security policy for P . Given an initial conﬁgura-
tion cI : NamesI →  deﬁning the contents of the input channels, the initial state is deﬁned as q(cI ) =
〈1, 0,0, , c0〉, where ∀t ∈ B : 0(t) = minL, ∀x ∈ Var : 0(x) = (0,minL), the stack is empty, ∀a ∈ NamesI :
c0(a) = (cI (a),P(a)), ∀b ∈ NamesO: c0(b) = (, minL).
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Fig. 9. The lift and the max functions.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (concrete state domain of the abstract interpretation). The concrete state domain of the abstract
interpretation is the complete lattice (℘(Q),⊆) where ℘ is the powerset operator and ⊆ the ordering relation.
This lattice has ∅ as the bottom element, Q as the top element, the least upper bound and greatest lower bound
operators are ∪ and ∩, respectively.
Given Q ⊆ Q and an instruction t, we denote by Q(t) the set of the states that have t as program counter.
We now deﬁne a “lifting” operation lift(Q) which, given a set of states Q, augments Q with extra states: for each
instruction t and each state q ∈ Q(t), a state q′ is added to Q that has the same execution values occurring in
q, but where the security levels of the environment, memory variables, stack and channels are upgraded to the
lub of the levels occurring in all the states belonging to Q(t). Fig. 9 shows the deﬁnition of lift(Q). The function
maxM(Q, x) is the lub of the security levels of x in the memories occurring in the states of Q. For each t ∈ B,
maxE(Q, t) is the lub of the values of (t) in the environment occurring in the states ofQ. Given a natural i ∈ 1..s,
maxS(Q, i) returns the lub of the security levels held by the stack item in position i in every state in Q. For each
channel a ∈ Names, maxC(Q, a) is the lub of the security levels held by the channel a in the states of Q. Given a
value v = (k , 	), up(v, ) = (k , 	 unionsqL ) is the value obtained by maintaining the execution part of the value and
upgrading the annotation of v. Finally, lift(q,Q) adds the state corresponding to a single state q.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (concrete next operator).Given a setQ ⊆ Q of concrete states, the application of the next operator
yields the set of lifted states that are either in Q, or can be reached in one step of computation, starting from the
states in Q:
next(Q) = lift
(
Q ∪
{
q | ∃q′ ∈ Q : q′ l−→ q
})
Proposition 4.6 (monotonicity of next). next is monotonic in (℘(Q),⊆).
Proof . Straightforward by deﬁnition of next. 
Deﬁnition 4.7 (collecting semantics). The concrete collecting semantics sem ∈ ℘(Q) is the least upper bound in
(℘(Q),⊆) of the following increasing chain, deﬁned for all n ∈ :
sem0 =
{
q(i0) | ∀i0 ∈ NamesI → 
}
semn+1 = next(semn)
The function lift at each step aligns the security annotations to the top in order to properly manage implicit
ﬂows. These are the security annotations of the states corresponding to the join point of different branches of
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a conditional instruction. This function is necessary for the soundness of the concrete semantics, proved by the
Theorem 4.8.
Example. Let us show that, if lift was not used by next, then the collecting semantics would not represent all
the information ﬂows. Consider the program in Fig. 10(a), whose corresponding high-level code is shown in
Fig. 10(b). The program does not respect the secure information ﬂow property, since the value inserted into the
public channel pubO depends on the value read from the private input channel privI: this value is 1 if the
contents of privI is 0, 3 otherwise.
There are two possible executions of the program, one when the value taken from privI is 0 and the other
when it is /= 0. In the ﬁrst case the false branch of the ﬁrst conditional jump instruction (labeled by 8) and the true
branch of the second conditional jump instruction (labeled 12) are executed. In the second case, the computation
follows the true branch of 8 and the false branch of 12. The collecting semantics collects two kinds of states at
instruction 11 = ipd(8):
(1) the state where the memory is: [(x) = (1,L),(y) = (0,H),(z) = (1,L)]: x contains a low value since
the assignment to x has not been executed;
(2) states where the memory is: [(x) = (0,H),(y) = (k /= 0,H),(z) = (1,L)]: x contains a high value since
the assignment to x has been executed under a high environment.
Let us now consider the second if at instruction 12: if it is executed starting from the state in (1), the condition
is true and the environment of the instructions in scope(12) is L: hence z is assigned (3,L) (instruction 14). If
instruction 12 is executed starting from the states in (2), since the condition is false, the assignment to z is not
executed and hence z maintains the value (1,L). Hence, in the memories belonging to all the states collected at
instruction 15, z is annotated with a low value. The send operation at instruction 16 is performed in any case
in low environment, since 16 ∈ scope(12). As a consequence, the level of channel pubO, on which the value of
Fig. 10. Example that shows the need for the function lift.
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z is sent, is not upgraded and remains L in any case. Thus the collecting semantics does not reveal any incorrect
ﬂow on channel pubO. The lift operation adds to the states collected at instruction 11 the state equal to that in (1)
except for the level of x, that is [(x) = (1,H),(y) = (0,H),(z) = (1,L)]. This state represents the fact that,
even though x has not been assigned during the execution of the if, its value, when the scope of the if is exited,
depends on the high condition of the if. Hence, instruction 16 is also executed starting from this state, and
channel pubO is upgraded to H . Note that, if all four combinations of the two branches of the two conditional
jump instructions were possible, the lift operation would not be necessary. In fact it is not used by the abstract
semantics, as it will be shown in Section 6, since the abstract semantics follows all the paths of the control ﬂow
graph, irrespectively of the fact that some computation may never occur.
The following theoremstates that the annotationofdataperformedby the concrete semantics gives a sufﬁcient
criterion to ensure the information ﬂow property, since it correctly associates values with the secrecy level on
which they depend (see Section 4.3 for the proof).
Theorem 4.8 (Soundness of the concrete semantics). A program P has a secure information ﬂow under a se-
curity policy P if for each concrete state 〈t, ,, s, c〉 ∈ sem, for each channel a ∈ Names, if c(a) = (, ), then
  P(a).
This theorem gives only a sufﬁcient condition for secure information ﬂow, i.e. not all secure programs satisfy
the hypotheses of the theorem. Consider, for instance, the compiled version of this high-level code
y=recv(privI);
x=1;
z=1;
if (y) {
send(x,pubO);
} else {
send(z,pubO);
}
where privI is a private input channel and pubO is a public output channel. Since pubO is manipulated in a
high environment, Theorem 4.8 cannot be applied to this program, even though it clearly has secure information
ﬂow since the same value is sent to the output channel in all possible executions. However, we believe that when
standard compiler optimizations (like constant propagation and redundancy elimination) are applied these cases
are very uncommon to occur.
4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.8
We start by deﬁning a relation of -equivalence between concrete domains.
Deﬁnition 4.9 (-equivalence). Let  ∈ L.
• Two concrete values v1 = (k1, 1) and v2 = (k2, 2) are -equivalent (v1 =V v2) if one of the following cases
holds:
1 L  and 2 L  and k1 = k2
1 L  and 2 L 
• Two environments 1 and 2 are -equivalent (1 =E 2) iff
∀t ∈ B : either 1(t) L  and 2(t) L  or 1(t) L  and 2 L .
• Two concrete memories 1 and 2 are -equivalent (1 =M 2) iff
∀x ∈ Var : 1(x) =V 2(x).
• Two concrete stacks s1 and s2 are -equivalent (s1 =S s2) iff s1 = s2 and ∀i ∈ {1..s1} : s1[i] =V s2[i].
• Two concrete channels a1 = (1, 1) and a2 = (2, 2) are -equivalent
(a1 =C a2) if one of the following cases hold:
1 L , 2 L  and 1 = 2
1 L  and 2 L 
• Two concrete states q1 = 〈t1, 1,1, s1, c1〉 and q2 = 〈t2, 2,2, s2, c2〉 are -equivalent (q1 =Q q2) iff
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t1 = t2 1 =E 2 1 =M 2 s1 =S s2 ∀a ∈ Names : a1 =C a2
The following lemma states that (a) the execution of a non-conditional jump instruction preserves
-equivalence; and (b) -equivalence is also preserved with a conditional jump instruction, provided that the
tested condition is less secret than .
Lemma 4.10.Let be q1 = 〈t, 1,1, s1, c1〉 =Q q2 = 〈t, 2,2, s2, c2〉 . If q1 l−→ q′1 =
〈
t′1, 
′
1,
′
1, s
′
1, c
′
1
〉
and q2
l−→ q′2 =〈
t′2, 
′
2,
′
2, s
′
2, c
′
2
〉
, then
′1 =E ′2 ′1 =M ′2 s′1 =S s′2 ∀a ∈ Names : c′1(a) =C c′2(a)
Moreover, if
• t is not a conditional jump instruction; or
• t is a conditional jump instruction and the top element of s1 has a security annotation L .
then it is true that t′1 = t′2.
Proof . By examining all possible kinds of instructions.
We can now prove the main theorem.
(Proof of Theorem 4.8.) Consider two concrete executions starting from the same conﬁgurations of the input
channels belonging to NamesI . Until a conditional jump instruction has not been reached with a high guard
(i.e. top of the stack L ), by Lemma 4.10 the two executions perform the same instructions and reach at
each step -equivalent states. In fact, if an input or output instruction is executed on a channel a such that
P(a) L , by the hypothesis the corresponding value is the same. If no conditional jump with high guard is
reached, the property is satisﬁed. If instead a conditional command is reached, say t, with a high guard, then
the two executions can be made up of different sequences of instructions, which may lead to not -equivalent
states. Let q1 = 〈t, 1,1, v1 · s1, c1〉 and q2 = 〈t, 2,2, v2 · s2, c2〉 the states reached by the two computations,
respectively, before the execution of t and let q11 =
〈
t11 , 
1
1,1, s1, c1
〉
and q12 =
〈
t12, 
1
2,2, s2, c2
〉
the states after the
execution of the instruction t. By the if rules of the semantics it holds that 11 =E 12, and for each instruction
t′ ∈ scope(t), it holds 11(t′) L  and 12(t′) L .While instructions that belong to scope(t) are executed, since
the annotation of values is upgraded to the level of the environment of the instructions, it holds: (i) if a variable
is updated, then the stored value has annotation L ; (ii) each item pushed onto the stack has annotation
L ; and (iii) no input or output channel a with P(a) L  is affected, otherwise sem would not respect the
condition imposed by the theorem (since the environment of the instruction is L , if a channel is updated,
the annotation of the channel would rise to a level L ). Two cases are possible:
Case 1. The instruction t¯ = ipd(t)doesnotbelong toscope(t) (i.e. there is no loop). In this caseboth computations
reach t¯. Let q¯1 =
〈
t¯, ¯1, ¯1, s¯1, c¯1
〉
and q¯2 =
〈
t¯, ¯2, ¯2, s¯2, c¯2
〉
, respectively, the corresponding states.Note that
¯1 =E 11 =E ¯2 =E 12. Let i and j be the minimum indices of the chain semn such that q¯1 ∈ semi and
q¯2 ∈ semj . Due to the lifting applied by next, there are two states in semmax(i,j)(t¯), qˆ1 =
〈
t¯, ˆ1, ˆ1, sˆ1, cˆ1
〉
and
qˆ2 =
〈
t¯, ˆ2, ˆ2, sˆ2, cˆ2
〉
, corresponding, respectively, to the lifting of q¯1 and q¯2, i.e. with the same execution
values, respectively, of q¯1 and q¯2, but with the security levels upgraded to the lub of all the states in
semmax(i,j)(t¯) . Consider a variable x. Due to the lifting operation issued by next, either both ˆ1(x) and
ˆ2(x) have annotation L , or both have annotation L . In the ﬁrst case, x has not been affected
by any instruction in scope(t) and thus ˆ1(x) = 1(x) and ˆ2(x) = 2(x). Since 1 =M 2, then, by
transitivity of equality, ˆ1(x) =V ˆ2(x). Since the reasoning holds for all variables, ˆ1 =M ˆ2. A similar
reasoning can be made for channels. Consider now the two stacks sˆ1 and sˆ2. They have the same length
by the language assumption, since the corresponding instruction (t¯) is the same. Consider a position
1  i  sˆ1: due to the lifting operation performed by next, either both sˆ1[i] and sˆ2[i] have annotation
L , or both have annotation L . Suppose sˆ1[i] = (k1, 	1) and sˆ2[i] = (k2, 	2) with 	1, 	2 L . Note
that (k1, 	1) and (k2, 	2) were already present in s1, respectively, s2 (the stacks immediately after the
execution of instruction t), since any pushing operation issued inside scope(t) pushes a value with
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higher annotation. Let s1[j1] = (k1, 	1) and s2[j2] = (k2, 	2). The stack portion from the bottom of sˆ1 to
i is equal to that from the bottom of s1 to j1, since (k1, 	1) was not popped out. Analogously, the stack
portion from the bottom of sˆ2 to i is equal to that from the bottom of s2 to j2. Since sˆ1 and sˆ2 have
the same length, then j1 = j2. By the equivalence of s1 and s2 it holds s1[j1] =V s2[j1] and by transitivity
sˆ1[i] =V sˆ2[i]. Since this occurs for each i, 1  i  sˆ1 = sˆ2, we have that sˆ1 =S sˆ2. Thus it holds that
qˆ1 =Q qˆ2. The above reasoning can be iterated following the two computations from, respectively, qˆ1
and qˆ2.
Case 2. All subsequent instructions of the program belong to scope(t) (there is a loop). By hypothesis, channels
with security level L  cannot be affected from this point on by either of the two computations and
thus the property is satisﬁed. 
5. Abstract domains
Abstract interpretation consists of a concrete and an abstract domain and two functions between them: an
abstraction function  and a concretization function  . The kind of abstraction and concretization function
are chosen depending on the property to prove. Nevertheless, to ensure the correctness of the method, the two
functions have to be related by a Galois connection or a Galois insertion [21]. Let us recall the deﬁnition of
Galois insertion.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Galois insertion). Let (C ,⊆) and (A,) be two complete lattices. Two functions :C → A and
 :A → C form a Galois insertion between (C ,⊆) and (A,), iff all the following conditions hold:
• -Monotonicity: ∀y , y ′ ∈ C. y ⊆ y ′ ⇒ (y)  (y ′)
• -Monotonicity: ∀a, a′ ∈ A. a  a′ ⇒ (a) ⊆ (a′)
• Galois: ∀y ∈ C. y ⊆ ((y))
• Insertion: ∀a ∈ A. ((a)) = a
The abstract domains of our abstract interpretation are obtained by retaining only the security annotation
of the data. Fig. 11 shows the abstract domain of data V: abstract values are security levels plus an undeﬁned
value ⊥V . The abstraction of a set of concrete values is ⊥V if the set is empty, otherwise it is the lub of the
security levels of the annotations of the values in the set. The concretization of an abstract value is ∅ for ⊥V and
contains all concrete values that have an annotation less than or equal to , for a level .
An abstract memory maps every variable to an abstract value. Fig. 12 shows that the abstract memories form
a lattice. The abstract domain C for channel is obtained from the concrete one simply by removing the execution
values part, that is: C = Names → L, and given y ∈ ℘(C), ∀a ∈ Names,
C(y)(a) =
⊔
L
{ | c(a) = (s, ), c ∈ y}
Fig. 11. Domain of abstract values and abstraction/concretization functions.
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Fig. 12. Domain of abstract memories.
Given c ∈ C the concretization function C : C → ℘(C) can be deﬁned as:
C(c) =
{
c | c ∈ C,∀a ∈ Names, c(a) = (, ),  ∈ ,  L c(a)
}
Proposition 5.2.
(i) V and V form a Galois insertion between V and V.
(ii) M and M form a Galois insertion between M and M.
(iii) C and C form a Galois insertion between C and C.
Proof . By deﬁnition. 
It remains to describe how stacks are modeled in the abstract semantics. This is done in the following
subsection.
5.1. Abstract stacks
Auseful property of abstract interpretation is that the abstract domain is ﬁnite. This means that the approach
can be used as the basis of a veriﬁcation tool. We deﬁne a domain of abstract stacks which is parametric with
respect to a maximum length n: thus a concrete stack of length m  n has an approximated abstraction. This
approximation helps to reduce the memory requirements of the veriﬁcation tool.
Given a natural n > 1, the abstract domain Sn of stacks with length at most n consists of sequences of n
abstract values in V having a (possibly empty) preﬁx of security levels, followed by a sequence of bottom values
⊥V . The length of the abstract stack is the preﬁx different from ⊥V . An empty stack is abstracted as a sequence
of n bottom values. For example, an abstract stack of length 2 in S4 is [1 · 2 · ⊥V · ⊥V ]. The domain Sn has
also a bottom element ⊥S .
Consider a concrete stack
s = [(v1, 1) · · · · (vn, m)]
If m < n, then its abstraction is the sequence of the m security levels of the concrete items, followed by n− m
bottom values:
[1 · · · m · ⊥V · · · ⊥V ]
If m  n, then the ﬁrst n− 1 elements of the abstraction is the sequence of the security levels of the ﬁrst n− 1
items, and the last element collapses the security levels of the remaining m− n+ 1 concrete items:
[1 · · · n−1 ·
⊔
i=n···m
i]
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Clearly, in this case we lose some information on the elements from the m-th to the stack bottom. For example,
the abstraction for n = 2 of s = [(v1, 1) · (v2, 2) · (v3, 3)] is [1 · (2 unionsqS 3)].
The abstract operations on the stack push : L× Sn → Sn and pop : Sn → Sn are deﬁned as follows:
pop(⊥S) = ⊥S
pop([v1 · · · vn]) = [v2 · · · vn−1 · vn · vn]
push(,⊥S) = [ · ⊥V · · · ⊥V ]
push(, [v1 · · · vn]) = [ · v1 · · · vn−2 · (vn−1 unionsqV vn)]
The following proposition proves the monotonicity of pop and push.
Proposition 5.3. pop and push are monotonic on Sn for each n > 1.
Proof . See Appendix A. 
Note that the pop operation, after removing the top element of the stack, duplicates the bottom element of the
original stack. The push operation collapses the last two elements of the original stack to obtain the new bottom
element. In this way the bottom element of the stack is always greater than or equal to each element that was
lost due to a push operations on a full stack.
As an example, consider the domain S2 of abstract stacks with maximum length n = 2. Fig. 14 shows this
domain when the lattice of security levels contains only two levels: L = {L,H } with LH . The complete domain
with its abstraction and concretization functions is shown in Fig. 13.
The following proposition states some properties of the abstract data type stack. In particular, when some
information is lost, the stack can be upgraded, but never downgraded.
Fig. 13. Domain of abstract stacks with n = 2 and abstraction/concretization function.
Fig. 14. The lattice of abstract stacks (n = 2, L = {L,H }).
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Proposition 5.4. Given n > 1 and s ∈ Sn,
(a) s S pop(push(, s))
(b) If the length of s is less than n, then: pop(push(, s)) = s
(c) push(, pop([′ · s])) = [ · s]
Proof . By deﬁnition. 
Point a means that issuing ﬁrst a push operation and after a pop one, the resulting stack may be different from
the original one, but always greater than or equal to it. Consider, for example, the domain S2 of abstract stacks
and the stack s = [L · H ] with length 2: pop(push(L, [L · H ])) = pop([L · H ]) = [H · H ]. Point b ensures that
equality holds if the length of the abstract stack is strictly less than n. Point (c) means that in the case of a pop
followed by a push no information about the bottom part of the stack is lost in any case.
The following proposition will be useful for proving the correctness of the abstract semantics.
Proposition 5.5. Let s ∈ S be a concrete stack.
(a) S(push((k , 	), s)) = push(	,S(s)))
(b) S(pop(s)) S pop(S(s))
(c) If s < n, then S(pop(s)) = pop(S(s))
Proof . See Appendix A. 
The above proposition states that, while the order in which push and S are performed is permutable, if we
ﬁrst apply pop and then we abstract the resulting stack, we obtain a result which may be less than the inverted
application of pop and S (point b). Point c ensures that equality holds if the concrete stack has length less
than n. As an example, consider n = 2 and the stack s = [(k1, 1) · (k2, 2)] with length 2. We have
S(pop(s)) = S([(k2, 2)]) = [2 · ⊥V ]
while
pop(S(s)) = pop([1 · 2]) = [2 unionsq 2]
Finally, the following proposition states the correctness of the abstraction on stacks.
Proposition 5.6. Functions S and S form a Galois insertion between S and Sn for each n > 1.
Proof . See Appendix A. 
From now on, we omit the subscript n from Sn when it is not relevant.
5.2. Abstract states
The abstract domain of states isQ : B → (L×M × S × C). It contains all the functions that associate the
instruction addresses with elements in (L×M × S × C). Given an abstract state q ∈ Q, and an instruction
label t ∈ B, q(t) = 〈,, s, c〉 is a tuple made up of a security level representing the security environment of t,
the abstract memory, stack and channels.
Given q ∈ Q, we use q(t).env, q(t).mem, q(t).stack and q(t).chan to denote,, s, c, respectively.Wealso
use the notation q(t).[f 1, f 2, · · · fn] to denote the ﬁelds {f 1, f 2, · · · fn} of q(t) (for example, q(t).[mem, stack]).
We denote by dom(q) = {t | q(t).[mem, stack , chan] /= ⊥M×S×C} the instruction addresses to which q assigns
a deﬁned value for memory, stack and channels. The abstract states are tuples consisting of n elements, where
n is the number of instructions of the program. We have that (Q,Q,unionsqQ,Q,⊥Q,Q) is a lattice, where, as
illustrated in Fig. 15, the operations are deﬁned as the pointwise application of the corresponding operations on
the ﬁelds of the abstract states.
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Fig. 15. Lattice of abstract states.
Let us now consider the abstraction and concretization functions between the concrete and abstract domains
of the states.
The abstraction function Q : ℘(Q) → Q is deﬁned as follows.
Let Q be a set of concrete states in Q = B × Env×M× S × C. We deﬁne Q(Q)(t) =
〈
,, s, c
〉
where
 = ⊔L{(t) | 〈t′, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q}
 = M({ | 〈t, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q})
s = S({s | 〈t, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q})
c = C({c | 〈t, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q})
Note that the environment of t is calculated by considering the environments that belong to all the states in
Q, while the memory, the stack and the channels are taken only from the states in Q that have t as program
counter. In fact the machine state is local information, while the environment is global information.
Moreover, if an instruction t does not occur in Q, then the set of memories, channels and stacks associated
with it are empty. Thus the abstraction functions M, S and C will produce bottom values of the respective
domains, excluding t from dom(Q(Q)). On the other hand, the environment of t can be a level different from
bottom, since it is computed by using all states in Q.
For the concretization function we have:
Q(q) = { 〈t, ,, s, c〉 | t ∈ dom(q), ∀t′ ∈ B, (t′)  q(t′).env,
, s, c ∈ M×S×C(q(t).[mem, stack , chan])}
The following theorem prove the correctness of the abstraction on states.
Theorem 5.7. Functions Q and Q form a Galois insertion between Q and Q.
Proof . See Appendix A. 
6. Abstract semantics and correctness
In this section, we give an abstract semantics that allows us to ﬁnitely execute the program in the abstract
domain. The rules of the abstract semantics are shown in Fig. 16. If the premise of a rule is true, the state q is
transformed in the way described by the rule. Given a domain D of tuples and a variable d with values in D, the
notation dunionsqD = d ′ means d = d unionsqD d ′. For the sake of simplicity, in the conclusion of the rule only the part of
q that is updated is indicated. For example, in the rule for pop, the only elements to be changed in the new state
are the ﬁelds [mem, stack , chan] of q(t + 1), and the new value of these ﬁelds is the lub between the old value
and the pair
〈
, pop(s), c
〉
. Each rule behaves like the corresponding in the concrete semantics, but acts on
security levels instead of execution data. It modiﬁes the ﬁelds mem, stack and chan of the immediate successor
instructions: t + 1 for all non-jumping instructions, j for unconditional jumps, t + 1 and j for conditional jumps.
Rule if also modiﬁes the ﬁeld env of all the instructions in scope(t). We assume that the transition can only be
applied to well-formed states, i.e. only to states with non-bottom values for memory, stack and channels.
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Fig. 16. Abstract semantics.
Let us denote by
−→ the relation between the abstract states induced by the rules.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (initial abstract state). Let P be a program and P a security policy for P . The initial state q0 of
the abstract semantics is deﬁned as q0(1) =
〈
minL,0, [⊥V · · · ⊥V ], c0
〉
, where ∀x ∈ Var : 0(x) = minL, ∀a ∈
NamesO : c0(a) = minL and ∀a ∈ NamesI : c0(a) = P(a). Moreover ∀t /= 0 : q0(t) = 〈minL,⊥M,⊥S ,⊥C〉
Deﬁnition 6.2 (next operator). Given an abstract state q, the application of the next operator yields the state
reached in one step of computation from each instruction:
next(q) =
⊔
Q{q¯
 | q −→ q¯}
Proposition 6.3 (monotonicity of next). next is monotonic in (Q,Q).
Proof . By the abstract semantic rules. 
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Deﬁnition 6.4 (abstract semantics). The abstract semantics sem ∈ Q is the least upper bound in (Q,Q) of
the following increasing chain, deﬁned for all n ∈ :
sem0 = q0
semn+1 = next(semn)
The following theorem states the correctness of the abstract semantics.
Theorem 6.5 (Global correctness). Q(sem)  sem.
Proof . See Appendix A. 
Corollary 6.6. A program P has secure information ﬂow under a security policy P , if, for each t ∈ B, the following
condition holds: if sem(t) = 〈t,, s, c〉 , then ∀a ∈ Names, c(a) L P(a).
Proof . Combining Theorem 6.5 with Theorem 4.8. 
Note that the security level of the output channels produced by the instruction level security analysis allows
us to identify secure channels with respect to P , independently from the safety of the program. In fact a channel
a such that sem.chan(a) L P(a) can be considered secure, since the the information ﬂowing through a is not
affected by data with a level higher than P(a).
The following proposition connects the accuracy of the analysis with the size of abstract stacks.
Proposition 6.7. Let us denote by sem,n the abstract semantics in the case of abstract stacks of size n (that is the
domain of the abstract stacks is Sn). Then , ∀n  1, ∀t ∈ B
(a) sem,n+1(t).chan C sem,n(t).chan
(b) if m is the maximum length of the concrete stack in any execution,
∀n > m: sem,n+1(t).chan = sem,n(t).chan,
Proof . From Proposition 5.4. 
Point a states that greater is the size of the abstract stack, more precise is our analysis. Point b claims that, to
achieve the maximum precision, it sufﬁces to use in the analysis abstract stacks of size n+ 1, if n is the maximum
length of the execution stack.
Example. To see an example of how the precision of the analysis increases with the size of the abstract stack,
look at Fig. 17. The second and the third columns show the abstract states calculated by the abstract semantics
with n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. At instruction 8, with S2, the top of the stack (the item to be sent) is H and
hence the level of the public output channel pubO becomes H , whereas with S3, the top of the stack is L and
pubO maintains L as level. Hence the program is accepted with S3, but not with S2. Increasing further the size
of the abstract stacks does not result in any improvement, since the maximum length of the execution stack
is 2.
A slight modiﬁcation of the method can be used when the security policy assigns a level only to a subset of
the channels. To perform this analysis, in the initial state only channels belonging to the domain of the policy
are set to their level, while all other input and output channels are set to the minimum level. In this case the
level computed for the not ﬁxed channels is an output of the checker: security can be ensured by not allowing
users that have a certain conﬁdentiality level to access channels for which a higher level was calculated by the
analysis. This calculation of the level of channels may enable code to be reused, especially when more complex
security lattices are used.
The analysis can also be used if we connect programs by means of the channels to obtain a concurrent
program. In this scenario, a policy assigns a level only to the external channels, but not to channels connecting
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Fig. 17. The size of the abstract stack affects the accuracy of the analysis.
two processes. The level of these channels may be computed by iteratively applying the analysis to the processes,
starting from the assignment to internal channels of the minimum level, until a ﬁxpoint assignment to these
channels is reached.
6.1. Notes for an implementation
The abstract semantics is the basis of the instruction-level security analysis. The abstract rules can be applied
until a ﬁxpoint is reached. A static checker can perform this calculation using for instance the Kildall working
list algorithm [35] (as the Java Bytecode Veriﬁer does).
Let us now brieﬂy discuss the complexity of the analysis. The space complexity is O(N · log(M) · n)whereN is
the total number of variables and channels plus the size of the abstract stack,M is the number of elements in L,
and n is the number of instructions. The time complexity is theoretically O(N 2 ·M · n). In fact, every application
of an abstract rule has a linear complexity in N due to the least upper bound operation on the abstract memory,
and, in the worst case, the abstract state of every instruction can have up to O(N ·M) different values during
the veriﬁcation process. However, in practice, the number of abstract executions is much smaller. As suggested
by Leroy [38], the analysis can be conducted at the level of the basic blocks instead of single instructions, saving
only the state for the beginning of each basic block and calculating the others on the ﬂy. This helps to reduce
the space complexity to O(N · log(M) · B), and the time complexity to O(N 2 ·M · B), where B is the number of
basic blocks.
7. A non-trivial example
In this section, we present the analysis of a simple yet expressive example. Imagine we have an
application that provides information about tax rates (see Fig. 18(c)). Let us suppose there are two possible tax
rates: one for incomes below a threshold, and the other for higher incomes. The rates and the threshold are
not hard-coded in the program, but are retrieved from the network, since their values can change. Users
can request:
• the speciﬁc rate they have to apply to their own income (request code 0), by providing the income;
• the value of the threshold (request code 1);
• the value of the low rate (request code 2);
• the value of the high rate (request code 3).
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In order not to overload the network, the application caches the threshold and the rates, and only updates
their values if there is a code 0 request. The application fetches the values of the threshold and the rates
from the corresponding input channels (threshold, lowRate and highRate). Users communicate with the
application by putting the code request into the channel userReq. The application retrieves ﬁrstly the threshold
and the rates from the network, and then loops forever, accepting and serving users requests. When there is
a code 0 request, since incomes and calculated tax rates are assumed to be conﬁdential, the application uses
the dedicated pair of channels income and rateRes, while responses to other requests are sent through the
channel userRes.2
Therefore a possible security policy could be:
P(threshold) = P(lowRate) = P(highRate) = L
P(clientReq) = P(clientRes) = L
P(income) = P(rateRes) = H
A ﬁrst version of the application can be seen in Fig. 18(a) (source code in 18(b)). The opcode eq (geq)
pops the two topmost items off the stack and pushes 1 if the ﬁrst is equal to (or greater than) the second, 0
otherwise.
We can observe that, under this policy, the program does not respect the secure information ﬂow property. In
fact, an attacker that is able to observe the channel lowRate and highRate can gather information about the
incomes by observing which of the two tax rates are requested to the network. This conjecture can be veriﬁed
by computing the abstract semantics of the program with abstract stacks of length 2 (see Fig. 19). In fact, the
security level of lowRate, highRate and userRes exceeds that speciﬁed by the policy.
We can correct the program by changing the case ‘0’ branch, as shown in Fig. 20. In this version, the
application requests both rates to the net, whatever the value of the income is, and then only sends the proper
rate to the clientRes channel. The abstract semantics is in Fig. 21. The table highlights that the levels of the
channels are always equal to those speciﬁed by the policy P . The program can thus be considered secure. Note
that the variable tmp holds both conﬁdential data (the income, with level H ) and public data (the code of the
request, with level L), but in different instructions of the program: at instructions 7–8, and 38–46 the level tmp
is H , in all the other instructions it is L. The ability to have security annotations for the same entity which are
instruction-dependent makes our method ﬂow-sensitive, as discussed below.
8. Related work
The secure information ﬂow property of programswas pioneered by a number of authors: Bell and La Padula
[12], Denning [25], and Goguen and Meseguer [29]. Denning and Denning [26], Andrews and Reitman [4], and
subsequently Banâtre et al. [6], addressed program certiﬁcation, which statically analyses secure information
ﬂow.
Most recent work that presents methods to check secure information ﬂow is based on security typing: each
variable is associated with a security type and secure information ﬂow is checked by means of a type system [1,
11,30,36,41,43,44], see also the exhaustive survey presented by Sabelfeld and Myers [42]. A type-based approach
was also described in previous papers of Zdancewic and Myers [46,47], where non-interference is studied in
imperative higher-order languages by means of a continuation passing style (CPS) translation of the programs.
Linear continuations are used to handle implicit ﬂows. The advantage of these approaches is efﬁciency, since fast
typing algorithms can be used. On the other hand, most of these methods are ﬂow-insensitive, since the analysis
is independent of the order in which the instructions are executed. Consider again the lattice L = {L,H },LH .
The simple high program fragment l=h; l=0; where h holds high-level information and l is required to hold
only public data, is secure if we observe the ﬁnal state, where the contents of variable l is 0, irrespectively, of
the initial contents of variable h. On the other hand, the program l=0; l=h;, where the order of the two
2 For instance, income and rateRes could refer to a SSL connection, while the other channels to plain-text connections.
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Fig. 18. The tax example: insecure version. In the assembly code the same variable (tmp) is used to store rate and income.
instructions is inverted, is not safe, since the ﬁnal value of l depends on the initial value of h. A ﬁxed security
typing approach rejects both programs, since it computes for l the type (level)H . In fact, in ﬁxed security typing
the same security type is computed for each variable and holds for the whole program. Hence, the assignment
l=h; is considered not correct, whenever it occurs in the program, since h has type H and l has type L.
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Fig. 19. The tax example: abstract semantics of the insecure version.
Anapproach is calledﬂow-sensitive if the corresponding analysis provides a different abstraction for variables
at different points of the program. A ﬂow-sensitive approach distinguishes the two programs above, and certiﬁes
the ﬁrst, but not the second. In fact, for the ﬁrst program, at the ﬁrst instruction the security type (level) of l is
H , but at the second one it is L. Hence the program can be certiﬁed (obviously if the safety requirements concern
only the ﬁnal state).
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Fig. 20. The tax example: secure version.
Many ﬂow-sensitive methods have been deﬁned to check secure information ﬂows. Some of them are based
on data-ﬂow analysis [19,27]. Both compute the data/control-ﬂow dependencies among the variables of the
program. Other works [34,3,32] are based on logics. Joshi and Leino [34] use a Hoare-like logics, while the
approach by Jacobs et al. [32] is based on the PVS theorem prover. Amtoft et al. deﬁned in a recent paper
[3] an inter-procedural and ﬂow-sensitive analysis for a Java-like language. Their approach exploits assertions
in the logic that can be either provided by the data and the control ﬂow analysis, or speciﬁed directly by the
programmer (à la JML). The data/control-ﬂow based and logical approaches to information ﬂow generally
allow a ﬁner inspection of the properties than a typical security typing approach, but they may be less efﬁ-
cient.
Our analysis is ﬂow-sensitive: it allows a memory location, stack element, or channel to hold data with a
different secrecy level in different instructions of the program. Hence it is more precise than ﬁxed security typing
and is able to certify a larger class of programs such as, for example, the equivalent in our language of l=h;
l=0.
A recent paper by Hunt and Sands [31] introduces a ﬂow-sensitive security typing system, that is able to
calculate the security type of the variables of a simple While language in a context-sensitive way. It also shows
that the powerset of the variables is a universal lattice of types from which all other typings can be obtained. If
we compare this approach to ours, and allow for the fact that different languages, deﬁnitions and formalisms
are considered in the two works, the two methods would seem to achieve the same level of accuracy. Hunt
and Sands also present an algorithm that transforms a program that can be typed in the ﬂow-sensitive typing
system into one that can be typed in a ﬂow-insensitive typing system. The transformation adds a number of
variables to the original program. A similar transformation for Java bytecode was suggested by Leroy [37] to
reduce the memory space for the bytecode veriﬁer when it is installed on smart-cards. The algorithm adds new
variables and makes some other transformations in order to manage a unique state instead of a table with a
state conﬁguration for each instruction. This algorithm can be simply adapted to reduce the memory need for
instruction-level security analysis.
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Fig. 21. The tax example: abstract semantics of the secure version.
Other recent works have analysed information ﬂow in the framework of abstract interpretation [45,28]. The
method proposed by Zanotti [45] is different from our approach since in their case the abstract domain is the
lattice of types. As a consequence, the method is ﬂow-insensitive and has the power of ﬁxed security typing. The
focus of the paper byGiacobazzi andMastroeni [28] is the notion of abstract non-interference. They observe that
classical non-interference does not allow private information to be disclosed at all, thus being a property that is
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too strict for use in practical contexts. In many cases, the attacker cannot observe all the information sent to the
output, but only some of its properties. On the other hand, if the attacker is modeled as an abstract interpreter,
programs that leak private information can be deemed as being secure, provided that such information is not
observable by the attacker. In this approach the abstract interpretation is exploited tomodel observation instead
of computation.
The SLam calculus of Heintze and Riecke [30] is a typed -calculus, that maintains security information as
well as type information. Data are annotated with security types. The type system propagates both secrecy and
integrity, maintaining distinct forms of security information: for example, which agents could have created an
object or which agents may read an object. A ﬁner grained control of security is achieved, due to the richness of
the domain of types and the fact that different levels of securitymaybe assigned to the different components of an
object. The language has been extended also to include commands of imperative languages, such as assignments.
It could be interesting to deﬁne an abstract interpretation acting on the domain of security levels used in this
work.
Finally, we remark that our deﬁnition of secure information ﬂow property does not concern only the ﬁnal
state of the program, as in nearly all the approaches cited above, but also the intermediate states of the execution,
and in particular the whole sequence of manipulations of the input and output channels during the execution. In
most approaches, instead, they are the variables to be associated with a security level and their values in the ﬁnal
state is observed. Hence, there is a need to distinguish between a weak version of the property, which assumes
termination, and a strong version, that also veriﬁes the possible non-termination of the program due to an
incorrect information ﬂow. Our formulation of the property does not depend on the possible non-termination
of the program. In fact, even a program that may not terminate due to an incorrect ﬂow can be -secure if the
contents of the channels with a security level less than or equal to  is not affected by information with a level
higher than .
8.1. Related work on secure information ﬂow in low level languages
In 2002, Kobayashi and Shirane [36] adapted the Volpano [44] type system to low level languages. They
analysed a small subset of the Java Virtual Machine Language. Their typing rules generate a set of constraints,
which, once they have been reduced and solved, indicate whether the method respects non-interference. Their
analysis is simpler than ours, since local variables types are not allowed to change, and thus the method is ﬂow-
insensitive. However, the proposed type inference algorithm has a time complexity of O(n2) if n is the number
of instructions, which is comparable to ours (see Section 6.1).
A recent work by Barthe and Rezk [11] describes a type system à la Volpano for checking classical non-
interference in Java bytecode. Many of the advanced features of the language are addressed (objects, methods
and exceptions). Implicit ﬂows are handled by means of the concept of control dependencies region, similar to
the scope notion. Each method of a class can be veriﬁed separately from the others, according to a signature
that assigns security types to parameters, object ﬁelds, return value and to the effect of the method on the heap.
However, this analysis is not ﬂow-sensitive either, since the security level of each variable is ﬁxed throughout
all the method. This can be a problem, since optimizing compilers may decide to reuse a variable for different
purposes (i.e. to store conﬁdential and public data in different portions of the method).
Moreover, both these papers [11,36] are less precise than our approach in relation to the stack. In fact, on
entering a high if, they raise all the stack items to the H value, while we do not modify the stack. Consider
the simple program in Fig. 22(a) (a possible source code is in Fig. 22(b)) and suppose that x contains a private
value. Since the guard of the if is high, at instruction 3 the whole stack (constant value 1 included) is lifted to
the high security level even though its bottom part is not touched by the computation. In our approach, instead,
the stack is left unchanged, thus eventually resulting in a low value in the variable z. Our choice of not lifting
the stack at the conditionals is still safe since:
• every time a value is pushed into (loaded from) the stack, this value is upgraded with the security level of the
environment;
• the stack height is ﬁxed for every instruction.
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Fig. 22. An example to show the accuracy in handling the stack.
Therefore, we believe that this improvement is signiﬁcant since, in assembler code, the stack is often used to
temporarily store values that are then reused after a computation.
Medel et al. [40] proposed a ﬂow-sensitive non-interference analysis for an assembly language with heap and
registers. They extended a typed assembly language with two pseudo instructions that handle implicit ﬂows.
Every time a conditional instruction is reached, the label of the ipd is pushed into a stack of labels. When the
ipd is reached, its label is popped from the stack and the security level of the program counter can be lowered.
On the contrary, we calculate this information in advance, by computing the function scope.
A data-ﬂow approach for low-level languages has been suggested by Genaim and Spoto [27]. Their analysis
reveals all the ﬂows (implicit and explicit) that may arise in Java Bytecode. All the object-oriented features of
Java Bytecode are addressed (ﬁelds, methods, exceptions) have been addressed. The result of the analysis is a
set of dependencies, represented by Boolean functions. The power of the analysis is comparable with that of
our method. They provided an implementation that exploits binary decision diagrams for handling Boolean
functions, in order to improve efﬁciency and reduce memory space.
8.2. Previous work of the authors
Some of our previous work have dealt with the topic of this paper. We have considered non-interference
in timed automata [24] and parallel languages [10]; in this latter work, the secure ﬂow is checked essentially
by model checking. In another paper [15] we deﬁned an approach to check secure information ﬂow in Java
bytecode, based on program transformation.
An abstract interpretation framework was used as the basis of a ﬂow-sensitive analysis to check secure
information ﬂow in stack-based machine languages [13,8,9,14], while a similar method [7] was deﬁned for high-
level languages. All these papers consider a different security model of conﬁdentiality, concerning only the ﬁnal
states of the program and not including channels. They deﬁne a set of abstract rules, by means of which an
abstract transition system can be built. The analysis is more accurate than the one presented in the present
paper. In fact, the same instruction may occur in different states of the transition system, and each state may
be characterized by a different conﬁguration of the memory and the stack. Consider, for example, the program
fragment “1: if (not l) l=h; else skip; 2: ...” where l is low and h is high. If l is not equal to
0, its value is not updated and therefore there is no incorrect information ﬂow for l. On the other hand, if l=0,
the ﬁnal value of l is high and this violates the secure ﬂow property. The abstract transition system contains
two states for instruction 2: one state corresponds to the execution of the true branch of the conditional, in
which l is high; the other state corresponds to the execution of the false branch, in which l is low. Hence it is
possible to distinguish between these two situations by analyzing the transition system. If we apply the analysis
described in the present paper, the program is not certiﬁed, since l is high in the (only) row corresponding to
instruction 2. In fact the row contains the lub of the levels of all possible information ﬂows affecting l when
instruction 2 is executed. Unfortunately, because the number of states of the abstract transition system is too
high, this abstraction is not suitable to be directly used as the basis of a tool for checking secure information
ﬂow. In fact other techniques would need to be combined with abstract interpretation: in the above papers we
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used model checking to complete the veriﬁcation process. A similar combination of abstract interpretation and
model checking was suggested by Bibier et al. [17]. The method presented in the present work is much more
efﬁcient in time and space with respect to these previous approaches. This result is obtained by the deﬁnition of
a different abstraction which is more concise, even though we loose some precision.
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Appendix A. Proof of some propositions and theorems
A.1. Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proposition 5.3. pop and push are monotonic in Sn for each n > 1.
Proof . The proof is shown only for n = 2.
(pop ) We want to prove that s1 S s2 ⇒ pop(s1) S pop(s2). Consider s1 = [1 · 	1] ∧ s2 = [2 · 	2] (the
trivial case s1 = ⊥S is omitted). Then, since 	1 V 	2 is true by hypothesis, pop(s1) = [	1 · 	1] S [	2 · 	2] =
pop(s

2).
(push ) We want to prove that 1 V 	1 ∧ s1 S s2 ⇒ push(1, s1) S push(	1, s2). We proceed by enumera-
tion on s1 and s

2:
(s

1 = ⊥S ∧ s2 = ⊥S) push(1,⊥S) = [1,⊥S ] S [	1,⊥S ] = push(	1, s2)
(s

1 = ⊥S ∧ s2 = [	2 · 	3]) push(1,⊥S) = [1 · ⊥V ] S [	1 · 	2 unionsqV 	3] = push(	1, s2) since, by hypothe-
sis, 1 V 	1.
(s

1 = [2 · 3] ∧ s2 = [	2 · 	3]) push(1, s1) = [1 · 2 unionsqV 3] S [	1 · 	2 unionsqV 	3]=push(	1, s2) since, byhypoth-
esis, it holds that i V 	i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proposition 5.5. Let s ∈ S be a concrete stack.
(a) S(push((k , 	), s)) = push(	,S(s)))
(b) S(pop(s)) S pop(S(s))
(c) If s < n, then S(pop(s)) = pop(S(s))
Proof . Again, only the case n = 2 is considered (Sn is the domain of the abstract stacks)
(a) We proceed by enumeration on s:
(s = )
S(push((k , 	), )) = S([(k , 	)]) = [	,⊥V ]
push(	,S()) = push(	,⊥S) = [	,⊥V ]
(s = [(k1, 	1)])
S(push((k , 	), [(k1, 	1)])) = S([(k , 	) · (k1, 	1)]) = [	, 	1]
push(	,S([(k1, 	1)])) = push(	, [	1,⊥V ]) = [	, 	1]
(s = [(k1, 	1) · · · · (km, 	m)]) m ≥ 2
S(push((k , 	), s)) = S([(k , 	) · (k1, 	1) · · · · (km, 	m)]) = [	,
⊔m
i=1 	i]
push(	,S(s)) = push(	, [	1,
⊔m
i=2 	i]) = [	, 	1 unionsq
⊔m
i=2 	i] = [	,
⊔m
i=1 	i]
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(b) Again, three cases depending on the length of s (the case where s =  is omitted):
(s = [(k1, 	1)]) S(pop(s)) = S() = ⊥S
(s = [(k1, 	1) · (k2, 	2)])
S(pop(s))=S([(k2, 	2)])=[	2,⊥V ] S [	2, 	2]=pop([	1, 	2])=pop(S(s))
(s = [(k1, 	1) · · · · (km, 	m)]) m > 2
S(pop(s))=S([(k2, 	2) · · · · (km, 	m)]) = [	2,
⊔m
i=3 	i] S [
⊔m
i=2 	i ·
⊔m
i=2 	i] =
pop([	1 ·⊔mi=2 	i]) = pop(S(s))where the inequality is ensured by the mono-
tonicity of the operator unionsq.
(c) See the previous case. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 5.6
Proposition 5.6. S and S form a Galois insertion on Sn for each n  1.
Proof . Again, the proof for the case n = 2 follows.
(-Monotonicity) Let y , y ′ ∈ ℘(S). Since V (y) =
⊔
S
si∈y
1S(vi) and y ⊆ y ′, we can write S(y ′) = S(y) unionsqS
⊔
S
si∈y\y ′
1S(si). The monotonicity of the lub unionsqS thus ensures that S(y) S S(y ′).
(-Monotonicity) We have to prove that ∀s1 , s2 ∈ S, s1 S s2 ⇒ S(s1) ⊆ S(s2). This property is trivially
true for s1 = ⊥S . Consider now the case where s1 = [,⊥V ],  /= ⊥V . We now have two sub-cases: (a) s2 =
[	,⊥V ], 	 V  (b) s2 = [	1, 	2],⊥VV	2,  V 	1. The subcase (a) directly follows from the deﬁnition of S
applied to s1 and s

2 and the fact that 	 V . For subcase (b), we have:
S(s1) = S([,⊥V ]) ⊆ ( because  V 	1)⊆ S([	1,⊥V ]) ⊆ ( from subcase (a))
⊆ S([	1, 	2]) = S(s2).
The last case happens when both s1 and s

1 have non-bottom elements. If s

1 = [1, 	1] and s2 = [2, 	2] then
s

1 S s2 implies 1 V 2 and 	1 V 	2. From these facts and the deﬁnition of V , the property directly follows.
(Galois) We must show that ∀y ∈ S , y ⊆ S(S(y)). Besides the trivial y = ∅ and y = {}, consider these
two cases: (a) y contains stacks with length at most 1; (b) y contains at least one stack whose length is greater
than 1. In case (a), V (y) = [,⊥V ] where  =
⊔
V{[(k ,	)]}∈y
	. Since V ([,⊥V ]) contains the empty stack plus all
the stacks with length one whose top element has a security level lower or equal to , then it must contain all
the elements of y . In case (b), V (y) will be in the form [1, 2], where 1 and 2 are the least upper bounds
of the security levels of the top and non-top elements of stacks in y , respectively. Now the concretization of
V (y)will contain all the concrete stacks (also those whose length is less than or equal to 1) whose elements have
security levels lower than 1 (top elements) and 2 (other elements). This inﬁnite set contains all the elements of y .
(Insertion) To prove the insertion property, it is necessary to show that ∀s ∈ S,S(S(s)) = s. Again,
we proceed by cases. Excluding the trivial s = ⊥S and s = [⊥V · ⊥V ] we can consider: (a) s = [ · ⊥V ]; (b)
s = [1 · 2],⊥VV2. In case (a) S(s) = {} ∪ {[(k , 	)] | 	 L }, whose abstraction is clearly again s. In
case (b), the expression for S(s) is a bit more complicated by the presence of the 1-element stacks; however the
property clearly holds. 
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A.4. Proof of Theorem 5.7
The following proposition states that the abstraction of a set of concrete states is the least upper bound of
the abstractions of the single elements of the set.
Proposition A.1. ∀Q ∈ ℘(Q),
Q(Q) =
⊔
Q
q∈Q
Q({q})
Proof . By deﬁnition of Q. 
Theorem 5.7. Q and Q form a Galois insertion.
Proof .
(-Monotonicity) We want to prove that, ∀Q,Q′ ∈ ℘(Q),Q ⊆ Q′ ⇒ Q(Q) Q Q(Q′). From the deﬁnition
of Q it is straightforward to prove dom(Q(Q)) ⊆ dom(Q(Q′)). It remains to prove that, given t ∈ B with
Q(Q)(t) =
〈
,, s, c
〉
, Q(Q)(t) =
〈
′,′, s′, c′
〉
, it is true that: (1)  L ′, (2)  M ′, (3) s S s′ and
(4) c C c′. The ﬁrst inequality holds by deﬁnition of Q and the set inclusion between Q and Q′. The other
three are proven by the fact Q ⊆ Q′ ⇒ {〈t, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q} ⊆ {〈t, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q′}.
(-Monotonicity) To prove this property, wemust show that ∀q1 , q2 ∈ Q, q1 Q q2, Q(q1) ⊆ Q(q2). Firstly,
we note that q1 Q q2 implies dom(q1) ⊆ dom(q2). Other consequences of the hypothesis are that, if q1(t) =〈
1,

1 , s

1 , c

1
〉
and q2(t) =
〈
2,

2, s

2, c

2
〉
, then 1 L 2, 1 M 2, s1 S s2 and c1 C c2. By −monotonicity
forM, S and C, we have that M(1) ⊆ M(2), S(s1) ⊆ S(s2) and C(c1) ⊆ C(c2). All these facts sufﬁce to
state that, by construction of Q, Q(q1) ⊆ Q(q2).
(Galois) Let Q ∈ ℘(Q) and q ∈ Q, q = 〈t, ,, s, c〉. We will show that q ∈ V (V (Q)) to prove that Q ⊆
Q(Q(Q)).
q ∈ Q ⇒ {q} ⊆ Q ⇒ (by monotonicity of Q)
⇒ Q({q}) Q V (Q) ⇒ (by monotonicity of Q)
⇒ Q(Q({q})) ⊆ Q(Q(Q)).
Thus, it sufﬁces to prove that q ∈ Q(Q({q})). We have that Q({q}) = q, with dom(q) = {t} and Q({q})(t) =
〈(t),M(),S(s),C(c)〉. Applying Propositions 5.2 and 5.6 we have that q ∈ Q(Q({q})) = {
〈
t′, ′,′, s′, c′
〉
| ∀t′ ∈ B, ′(t) L (t),′ M , s′ S s, c′ C c} which clearly contains q.
(insertion) We have to prove that ∀q ∈ Q,Q(Q(q)) = q. We will show that the property holds analyzing
each ﬁeld of a generic abstract state for the instruction t. For the environment we have:
Q(Q(q))(t).env = (by deﬁnition of Q)
= ⊔L {(t) | 〈t′, ,, s, c〉 ∈ Q(q)} = (by deﬁnition of Q)
= ⊔L {(t) L q.env} = q.env
and for the memory:
Q(Q(q))(t).mem = (by deﬁnition of Q)
= M
({
 | 〈t, ,, c, s〉 ∈ Q(q)
}) = (by deﬁnition of Q)
= M
(
Q(q.mem)
) = (by Proposition 5.2)
= q.mem
The stack and channels parts are omitted. 
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A.5. Proof of Theorem 6.5
We now prove the correctness of the abstract semantics, with respect to the concrete one. The following
proposition states that each abstract rule correctly approximates its corresponding concrete version.
Proposition A.2 (Arrow correspondence).
∀q ∈ Q : q l−→ q′ ⇒ Q({q}) −→ q′ such that Q({q, q′}) Q q′
Proof . Let us suppose q = 〈t, ,, s, c〉, q′ = 〈t′, ′,′, s′, c′〉. If t = t′ the proof is trivial. Let t /= t′. From the
deﬁnition of abstraction function we have that dom(Q({q})) = {t}, dom(Q({q, q′})) = dom(q′) = {t, t′}. More-
over, Q({q, q′})(t) = Q({q}) since t /= t′. For each instruction t¯ ∈ {t, t′} it holds that, Q({q, q′})(t¯) = q′(t¯).
Let ({q, q′})(t) = 〈,, s, c〉, where  = (t). Now, since by the concrete semantics rules,  E ′ and t′ ∈
dom(Q({q})), then Q({q, q′})(t′) = Q({q′})(t′)What remains to prove is that Q({q′})(t′) is less than or equal
to q′(t′). We proceed by cases that depend on the type of instruction with label t.
(op) Omitted.
(push) This instructiononly affects the statusof the stack.Then, according to the rules, s′ = push((k , (t)), s),
s′ = push((t), s) and we have to prove that S(s′) S s′. This directly follows from the Propo-
sition 5.5(i), since s = S(s) by hypothesis.
(pop) Again, this instruction only affects the status of the stack: c′ = pop(s), s′ = push(s) and the proof
that S(s′) S s′ is obtained applying Proposition 5.5(ii).
(load) Again, only the stack changes after the execution of this instruction. We have: s′ = push((k , (t) unionsq
′), s) if (x) = (k , ′) and s′ = push((x) unionsq (t), s). On the other hand, since  = M(), then
(x) = V ((x)) = V (k , ′) = ′. Therefore, byapplyingProposition5.5(i)we canproveS(s′) S
s′.
(store) This instruction changes both the stack and the memory. From the point of view of the stack, the
instruction acts like a pop, so we can reuse the proof for the case (pop). For the memory we have:
′ =  [x ← (k , ′ unionsq (t))] if top(s) = (k , ′) and ′ =  [x ← top(s) unionsq (t)]. Since s = S(s) by
hypothesis, then top(s) = ′. To prove M(′)  ′ we can observe that they may differ only in
terms of the variable x for which it holds that M(′)(x) = V (′(x)) = V (k , ′ unionsq (t)) = (′ unionsq
(t)) = ′(x).
(send) In this case, besides the stack (forwhich this instruction behaves like apop), the status of the channels
changes as well. Suppose that we send the value to channel a, with c(a) = (, 	) and top(c) = (k , ′).
We have: c′(a) = (k · , 	 unionsqL ′) and therefore C(c)(a) = 	 unionsqL ′ unionsqL (t). Now, by abstracting we
obtain c(a) = 	 and, if we apply the abstract rule c′(a) = 	 unionsqL ′ unionsqL . Since  = (t) by hypothesis
and the other channels are unchanged, this case is proved.
(receive) For the stack, this subproof is similar to the (load) case. Suppose that we receive a value from the
channel a and c(a) = (k · , ′). We have: s′ = push((k , (t) unionsq ′), s) and s′ = push(c(a) unionsq (t), s).
On the other hand, since c(a) = C(c), then c(a) = ′. Therefore, if we apply Proposition 5.5(i) we
can prove S(s′) S s′. We can proceed similarly for the change in the channel status.
(goto) Omitted.
(if) Since the execution of an if instruction pops the tested value, for the stack we can reuse the proof
for the case (pop). If the top of the stack s has annotation 	′ then the abstract stack s = S(s) is in
the form [	′ · v1 · · · vn−1], and therefore the environment is upgraded by
−→ and −→ in the same
way.
(halt) Omitted. 
Lemma A.3. The application of lift preserves abstraction. That is ,∀Q ∈ ℘(Q),
Q(lift(Q)) = Q(Q)
1368 N. De Francesco, L. Martini / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 1334–1370
Proof sketch. Since lift(Q) contains all the states in Q, plus some states for which the security levels are lifted
to the least upper bound of states in Q, these latter states do not contribute to the least upper bound in the
application of Q. 
Proposition A.4 (Local correctness). next is a safe approximation of next :
∀Q ∈ ℘(Q) : next(Q) ⊆ (next((Q)))
Proof . It sufﬁces to prove that:
(next(Q))  next((Q)) (*)
Indeed, applying -monotonicity to (*), we can conclude:
next(Q) ⊆ ((next(Q))) ⊆ (next((Q)))
where the ﬁrst subset operation is given by the Galois property (Proposition 5.7).
Statement (*) can be derived directly from Proposition A.2 and from the deﬁnitions of next and next
operators. Using Proposition A.1 and the deﬁnition of next, we can rewrite the right-hand member of (*) as:
next((Q)) = next
⎛
⎝⊔
Q
q′′∈Q
({q′′})
⎞
⎠ = ⊔Q
q
−→ q′,q∈(Q)
q′
On the other hand, we can use the deﬁnition of next to obtain:
Q(next(Q)) = (by Deﬁnition 4.5)
= Q(lift(Q ∪
{
q′ | ∃q ∈ Q : q l−→ q′
}
)) = (by Lemma A.3)
= Q(Q ∪
{
q′ | ∃q ∈ Q : q l−→ q′
}
) =
=
⊔
Q
q→q′,q∈Q
Q({q, q′})
From these two results we can rewrite (*) as:
⊔
Q
q→q′,q∈Q
Q({q, q′}) 
⊔
Q
q
−→ q′,q∈(Q)
q′ (**)
Since Proposition A.2 holds, each state contributing to the left-hand lub is certainly less than or equal to a
state contributing to the right-hand lub. The lattice properties ensure that, given a, b, c, d in a lattice (A,), with
a  b ∧ c  d , then (a unionsq c)  (b unionsq d). By applying this property, we can conclude (**) and therefore the thesis.

Now, recalling Theorem 6.5:
Theorem 6.5 (Global correctness). Q(sem)  sem.
Proof . Using the Local Correctness and proving by induction that for every initial conﬁguration of the input
channels i0 ∈ NamesI →  , ∀j,Q(semj(i0)) Q semj . 
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